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ABSTRACT/RESUMÉ  
Product market regulation and competition in China 
The extent of competition in product markets is an important determinant of economic growth in both 
developed and developing countries. This paper uses the 2008 vintage of the OECD indicators of product 
market regulation to assess the extent to which China’s regulatory environment is supportive of 
competition in markets for goods and services. The results indicate that, although competition is 
increasingly robust across most markets, the overall level of product market regulation is still restrictive in 
international comparison. These impediments to competition are likely to constrain economic growth as 
the Chinese economy continues to develop and becomes more sophisticated. The paper goes on to review 
various aspects of China’s regulatory framework and suggests a number of policy initiatives that would 
improve the extent to which competitive market forces are able to operate. Breaking the traditional links 
between state-owned enterprises and government agencies is an ongoing challenge. Reducing 
administrative burdens, increasing private sector involvement in network sectors and lowering barriers to 
foreign direct investment in services would also increase competition and enhance productivity growth 
going forward. Some of the reforms introduced by the Chinese government over the past two years go in 
this direction and should therefore help foster growth. This paper relates to the 2010 OECD Economic 
Review of China (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/china). 
JEL Classification: F4 ; K2 ; L5 ; D2 
Keywords: Regulation; macroeconomic policy; China; productivity 
************************************ 
Règlementation du marché des produits et concurrence en Chine  
L’étendue de la concurrence sur le marché des produits est un déterminant important de la croissance 
économique dans les pays développés et en développement. Ce papier utilise la version 2008 des 
indicateurs de réglementation du marché des produits de l’OCDE pour évaluer dans quelle mesure 
l’environnement règlementaire en Chine favorise la concurrence sur les marchés de biens et services. Les 
résultats indiquent que, bien que la concurrence s’intensifie sur la plupart des marchés, le niveau général de 
la réglementation demeure restrictif au plan international. Ces entraves à la concurrence sont susceptibles 
de freiner la croissance à mesure que l’économie chinoise continue de se développer et devient plus 
sophistiquée. Ce papier examine ensuite différents aspects du cadre règlementaire chinois, et suggère 
différents types de mesures qui donneraient une plus grande latitude aux forces de marché. Briser les liens 
traditionnels entre entreprises publiques et agences gouvernementales reste un défi. Réduire les contraintes 
administratives, accroître la participation du secteur privé dans les secteurs de réseau et abaisser les 
barrières à l’investissement direct étranger dans les services stimuleraient aussi la concurrence et les 
progrès de productivité. Certaines des réformes introduites par le gouvernement chinois durant les deux 
dernières années vont dans ce sens et devraient donc encourager la croissance. Ce document se rapporte à 
l’Étude économique de la Chine de l’OCDE, 2010, (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/chine). 
Classification JEL : F4 ; K2 ; L5 ; D2 
Mots-clés: Règlementation ; politique macroéconomique ; Chine ; productivité 
Copyright OECD 2010 
Application for permission to reproduce or translate all, or part of, this material should be made to:Head 
of Publications Service, OECD, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris cedex 16, France. 
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Product market regulation and competition in China 
Paul Conway, Richard Herd, Thomas Chalaux, Ping He and Jianxun Yu
1 
Introduction and main findings 
China’ transition from a centrally-controlled economic system to a competitive environment driven by 
the private sector has been nothing short of extraordinary. After three decades of liberalisation, product 
markets have become increasingly competitive and market forces are now generally the main determinant 
of price formation and economic behaviour. Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in 2001, the government has enacted a raft of pro-competition measures including a landmark law 
explicitly recognising the equivalence of private assets with state and collective property. A competition 
policy framework has also been established and the regulation of firm entry and exit has been improved. In 
addition, administrative reforms have enhanced the capacity of central government to oversee a market 
economy and regulation has become less reliant on microeconomic interventions and increasingly focused 
on setting framework conditions. In conjunction with fundamental changes in the relationship between the 
government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), these measures have redrawn the boundary between the 
state and market and made a strong contribution to China’s increasing prosperity. 
This paper uses OECD indicators of the extent to which regulations that shape the business 
environment in markets for goods and services – henceforth referred to as product market regulation 
(PMR) – are conducive to competition and highlights areas in need of further improvement. These PMR 
indicators are new for China, but are based on a standardised procedure that has been used extensively to 
evaluate the stance of regulation in OECD and other countries. In Section  2, the paper sets out the 
underlying methodology and presents the overall indicator results for China. Although the elements of a 
competitive market-based economy are becoming increasingly well established, these results indicate that 
5 
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the transition is far from complete and that the reduction in the extent of government intervention lags 
behind China’s impressive economic development. 
In Section  3, firm-level data is used to assess the impact of an increasingly important private 
enterprise sector on the extent of competition in Chinese product markets. In Section 4, changes in the 
governance arrangements for SOEs and the impact on performance are evaluated. This section also reviews 
the structure of the industrial sector of the economy using the methodology adopted in previous OECD 
studies (Dougherty et al., 2007). 
In Section 5, the paper goes on to outline the detailed PMR indicator results and associated policy 
recommendations that would increase the role of competition in resource allocation and improve China’s 
future economic performance. If China is to maintain strong economic growth over the coming decades, 
policymakers must continue working to complete the institutional frameworks and processes that are 
already in place and strengthen implementation. In addition, ongoing improvements in SOE governance 
aimed at encouraging dividend payouts over industrial expansion would go a long way towards improving 
capital productivity in the state enterprise sector. Further reductions in the extent of state ownership in 
markets that are inherently competitive would also help in this regard. In some of the network sectors, 
regulatory changes have improved the scope for competition to some extent. However, ongoing work 
needs to focus on separating competitive and monopoly market segments and eliminating barriers to entry 
and public sector domination. In addition, the authorities need to develop the capacity and strengthen the 
hands of the sectoral regulators and further reduce direct intervention in the economy. Continuing to 
liberalise the regulation of foreign direct investment in services sectors would also benefit China’s 
economic performance going forward. 
The OECD’s PMR indicators
2 
The OECD’s PMR indicators assess the extent to which the regulatory environment promotes or 
inhibits competition in markets where technology and market conditions make competition viable. These 
indicators have been used extensively over the past decade to benchmark regulatory frameworks in OECD 
and other countries and have helped spur structural reforms that enhance economic performance. 
The PMR indicator system summarises a large number of formal rules and regulations that have a 
bearing on competition. These regulatory data cover most of the important aspects of general regulatory 
practice as well as a range of industry-specific regulatory policies, particularly in network sectors. This 
regulatory information feeds into 18 low-level indicators that form the base of the PMR indicator system 
(Figure 1). These low-level indicators are progressively aggregated into three broad regulatory areas: i) 
state control; ii) barriers to entrepreneurship; and iii) barriers to international trade and investment.
3
 In 
turn, at the top of the structure, the overall PMR indicator serves as a summary statistic of the general 
stance of product market regulation. 
6 
                                                            
2.   For a detailed presentation of the PMR indicators and the results for OECD countries, see Wölfl et al. 
(2009). 
3.  For ease of exposition, direct references to the names of PMR indicators are italicised throughout this 
paper. 
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Figure 1. The structure of the PMR indicator system 
 
Source: Wölfl et al. (2009). 
The PMR indicators have a number of characteristics that differentiate them from other indicators of 
the business environment. First, in principle, the low-level indicators only record “objective” information 
about rules and regulations, as opposed to “subjective” assessments of market participants as in indicators 
based on opinion surveys. This insulates the indicators from context-specific assessments and makes them 
comparable across time and countries. Second, the PMR indicators follow a bottom-up approach, in which 
indicator values can be related to specific underlying policies. One of the advantages of this system is that 
the values of higher-level indicators can be traced with an increasing degree of detail to the values of the 
more disaggregated indicators and, eventually, to specific data points in the regulation database. This is not 
possible with indicator systems based on opinion surveys, which can identify perceived areas of policy 
weakness, but are less able to relate these to specific policy settings. 
Product market regulation is still restrictive in China 
The OECD’s PMR indicators have been estimated for the first time for China based on regulatory 
data collected in 2008. They reveal that, despite liberalisation across a number of areas, product market 
regulation continues to substantially restrict competition. The overall PMR indicator is higher than in any 
of the OECD countries, including the emerging market economies within the OECD area (Figure 2).
4
 All 
three of the high-level sub-components of the overall PMR index are elevated in China relative to 
comparator countries, particularly state control and barriers to international trade and investment, and the 
overall indicator is around the same level as in Russia (Figure 3). As discussed below, this implies ample 
scope for improving the regulatory environment, which would help sustain China’s impressive economic 
performance going forward. Indeed, in fast-reforming countries, the situation is likely to have changed 
since the PMR data was collected.  
                                                            
7 
4.  By design, all the indicators in the PMR system range from 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive of 
competition. 
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Figure 2. The overall indicator of product market regulation as of 2008 
The indicator score runs from 0-6, representing the least to most restrictive regulatory regime 
 
Note: Users of the data must be aware that they may no longer fully reflect the current situation. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation database. 
Figure 3. Product market regulation in China, an international comparaison as of 2008 
 
Note: Users of the data must be aware that they may no longer fully reflect the current situation. 
Source: OECD, Product Market Regulation database. 
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The World Bank “Doing Business” indicators (World Bank, 2010) provide alternative and broader 
source of rankings that show China in more favourable light relative to other major emerging market 
economies. With respect to comparisons with advanced countries, the rankings in the combined indicator 
from this source are in broad agreement with those of PMR indicators. China is shown lower down the 
ranking than all but two of the countries shown above. In particular, the “Doing Business” indicators 
would rank the Russian Federation and Italy as worse places to do business than China, mainly because of 
implementation problems which are not covered by the product market indicators which focuses just on 
laws. However, only one of the four other major emerging market economies (South Africa) performs 
better than China. The other three (Brazil, India, Indonesia) perform markedly worse.  
The business environment in China has also improved considerably over the past five years according 
to this indicator. In terms of the reduction in the average barrier to business, China was one of the countries 
where barriers fell the most between 2005 and 2010. Two reforms in particular were at the root of this 
improvement: the new company law and the new bankruptcy law (OECD, 2005). These new laws helped 
reduce the time needed to close a business and increase the recovery rate from bankruptcy. The company 
law helped reduce the time needed to register a business and also reduce the minimum capital needed to 
start a company. Elsewhere a number of administrative improvements appear to have been made notable in 
reducing the number of tax payments and lowering cost of construction permits. 
Competition is increasingly robust in most markets 
Notwithstanding the overall PMR indicator score, competition is robust and increasing across much of 
China’s industrial sector. Indeed, the number of industrial sectors at the four-digit level that are assessed to 
be highly or moderately concentrated has decreased from just over one in four in 1998 to around one in 
eight in 2007 (Table 1), which is low by international standards, including in comparison with the United 
States (OECD, 2005a).
5 
Table 1. Market concentration in the industrial sector 
Number of industrial sectors in selected ranges of the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index
1  
(grouped by the US Department of Justice merger thresholds) 
  1998 2007 
  Number of 
industries  %  Number of 
industries  % 
Highly concentrated (over 1 800 points)  88  15  34  7 
Moderately concentrated (1 000 to 1 800)  70  12  36  7 
Not concentrated (under 1 000)  433  73  453  87 
Total number of industries  591  100  523  100 
1   The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the sum of squared market shares, out of 10 000; Industrial sectors used correspond to 
4-digit ISIC industries for China.  
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) industrial micro data and joint NBS-OECD analysis.  
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5 .  Because direct measures of competition do not exist, proxy measures are typically used in practice. 
Unfortunately, all proxies are imperfect and it is often possible to find examples where they do not 
accurately reflect competitive conditions. For example, economies of scale or scope may result in relatively 
high concentration ratios or prices that exceed marginal costs even when rivalry among firms may be 
strong. Despite these potential difficulties, concentration ratios are often used as a measure of competitive 
pressures. 
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Ironically, the foundations for robust product market competition in China are in part a legacy of the 
central planning era during which “complete sets” of manufacturing industries were established in many of 
the regions (Rawski, 2008). Compared to the Soviet Union, the management of industry was also 
significantly less centralised in China, with substantial authority given to provincial and local 
bureaucracies (Wong, 1986). Policymakers were also quick to see the benefits of competition early in the 
reform period and tended to divide the production bureaus of the line ministries into several SOEs within 
the same industry.
6
 At the same time, restrictions on intermediate inputs were eased through the dual-track 
system, permitting a large expansion of the Township and Village Enterprises. Many of these enterprises 
began by supplying the SOEs, but ended up competing with them. 
Although these factors may have laid the groundwork, the rise of market competition in China largely 
reflects the exit of SOEs and the burgeoning of the private sector. Thirty years ago the Chinese economy 
was virtually fully owned and operated by different levels of government. At their peak in 1978, SOEs 
produced 78% of total industrial output and employed 60% of the non-farm workforce. Collectively-owned 
enterprises accounted for the rest, with no other type of business enterprise permitted at the time. After the 
approval of private firms in 1979, the share of output produced by non-state and non-collective enterprises 
increased rapidly. Although SOEs continued to expand until 1990, their employment share gradually 
declined over this period as the private sector grew more quickly. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the rationalisation of SOEs and liberalisation of the private sector 
were two key policy priorities underlying China’s industrial development. The ownership of small and 
mid-sized SOEs was diversified and privatised and SOEs incurring large losses were encouraged to merge 
or go bankrupt. As a result, the state-owned sector of the economy was dramatically reduced. After 
peaking at over 112 million workers in the mid-1990s, SOE employment began to fall in absolute terms 




In 2004, the privatisation process slowed. In the industrial sector, where the exit of SOEs has been the 
most rapid, the downsizing of SOE employment slowed down. With rapid growth in the private sector, 
however, the SOE share of employment, fixed assets and value added continued to decline, albeit at a 
slower pace (Figure 4). By 2007, despite only accounting for 6% of firms, SOEs directly controlled by the 
state produced 31% of the value added in the industrial sector, employed 22% of the workforce and 




6 .  For example, the telecommunications monopoly enjoyed by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication 
(MPT) was disrupted in 1994 by the introduction of a competitor, China Unicom. In 2000, the assets of the 
MPT were corporatised into two companies – China Telecom and China Mobile. A fourth major company, 
China Netcom, was hived off from China Telecom in 2002. This pattern of creating competing SOEs was 
repeated in other industries including oil, aviation, steel and power generation. 
7 .  Many of the privatisations that took place during this period simply involved recognising that a lot of the 
township and village enterprises formed in the 1980s were essentially private firms. Beginning in the 
mid-1980s, many firms registered as collectives, meaning they were controlled by local governments, 
re-registered as private firms when it because acceptable to “take off their red hats”. 
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Figure 4. The relative size of the state-enterprise sector 
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Source: Joint NBS-OECD analysis. 
The exodus of SOEs from China’s industrial sector has been more than offset by rapid private sector 
growth. Exiting SOEs have generally been small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and their departure 
has tilted the employment distribution of the remaining SOEs towards larger firms. However, the influx of 
private-sector firms has driven a large increase in the number of SMEs operating in China’s industrial 
sector. Overall, since the late 1990s, average employment at the firm level has fallen slightly as fewer and 
increasingly large SOEs are more than offset by a proliferation of smaller private-sector firms (Table 4 
below). 
The development of the private enterprise sector began in China’s eastern coastal provinces that were 
at the forefront of many of the early reforms – in particular, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tianjin and 
Fujian. In 1998, 64% of industrial value added in these regions was produced by the private sector, 
11 
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compared to an average of only 24% across China’s other regions. By 2007, although the private-sector 
share of value added in the five leading eastern coastal provinces had increased to 80%, it had doubled to 
almost 50% in China’s other regions, narrowing the gap relative to the coastal regions. This burgeoning of 
private enterprises across China displays a pattern of “convergence” whereby the private-sector share of 
value added has grown fastest in provinces previously dominated by the state-enterprise sector (Figure 5). 
This pattern of the private sector “spreading out” across China is clearly apparent across most regions with 
the exception of some of the relatively undeveloped western provinces and Heilongjiang in the Northeast. 
Figure 5. Private sector development (industrial sector) by region, 1998-2007 
 
Source: Joint NBS-OECD analysis. 
Redrawing the boundary between the public and private sectors has heightened product market 
competition. In 1998, SOEs produced more than half of value added in 36% of industrial sectors. In turn, 
around 40% of these sectors were highly or moderately concentrated (Table 2). By 2007, the number of 
industrial sectors dominated by SOEs had dropped to one in ten, although the percentage of these sectors 
with inadequate competition remained more or less unchanged. At the other end of the spectrum, in 1998 
SOEs produced less than 5% of value added in only 8% of industrial sectors whereas by 2007 this figure 
had risen to almost 45%. The percentage of these sectors with inadequate competition fell markedly over 
this period, indicative of large increases in the number of private sector firms with dispersed market share. 
12 
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Table 2. Industry concentration and state ownership in the industrial sector
1 
                                            Number and Share of state controlled enterprises in value added 
      
1988  Less than 5%  5 to 25%  25 to 50%  Greater than 50% 
  Number % Number % Number % Number % 
          
          
Highly  concentrated  16  35.6  13 7.6  9  5.6 50  23.3 
Concentrated 3  6.7  12  7.1 15 9.4 40  18.6 
Not concentrated  26  57.8  145 85.3 136 85.0 125 58.1 
          
All above sectors   45   7.6  170    28.8   160 27.1 215 36.4 
          
2007        
Highly  concentrated  17  7.3 4 2.2 3 5.9 9  16.4 
Concentrated 10  4.3  6 3.3 8  15.7  12  21.8 
Not concentrated  205  88.4  173  94.5 40 78.4 34 61.8 
          
All above sectors   232  44.5  183  35.1  51  9.8  55  106 
1   The extent of concentration across sectors is assessed using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index at the four-digit level. 
Source: Joint NBS-OECD analysis. 
This increase in product market competition has been a key driver of productivity gains. After a 
prolonged period of very low and volatile productivity growth, the commencement of economic reform 
triggered a large and sustained increase in total factor productivity (TFP). Recent studies estimate that TFP 
growth has averaged 2.7% to 3.8% per annum since the late  1970s, which compares favourably 
internationally (Table 3). 
Table 3. Various estimates of TFP growth over the reform period 
Various authors  OECD 
Perkins and Rawski (2008)  (2010) 
1978-2005 3.8  3.8 




1979-2005 2.7  3.8 
Wu (2008) 
1993-2004 2.9  4.0 
1993-1997 1.6  5.1 
1997-2000 4.3  2.7 
2000-2004 3.6  3.5 
Zheng et al. (2009) 
1978-2005 3.0  3.8 
1978-1995 3.7  4.1 
1995-2005 1.8  3.3 
Source: As in table. 
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Some moves may reduce competition 
There have been several industries where the extent of competition has been reduced. In the aviation 
industry, the government first consolidated the numerous existing state-owned airlines into three groups 
(China Air, China Eastern and China Southern), although the airlines continued to operate under their 
previous names. This process was finished in 2002. Then in 2005, the government allowed the entry of 
private companies into aviation. Quickly 14  companies were established. A number were weak 
managerially and some had a poor safety record. During 2009, air travel was hit by the slowing in Chinese 
growth and the fall in world trade. The three main airline groups received funds from the government to 
enable them to keep trading. However, the difficult trading environment meant that, by 2010, only one 
private company remained in business.  
In the telecommunications industry competition had been markedly increased at the beginning of the 
past decade, when the historic telephone company was split into two (land-lines and mobile), new entrants 
allowed into mobile telephony and two essentially network companies created. As a result, there were two 
companies with land line and mobile branches, one mobile only company and two network companies. The 
network companies specialised in delivering IP telephony and internet services to cable TV companies. All 
companies were state-owned. However, in 2008/9 the government decided to merge the network 
companies into the three more retail-oriented companies, reducing a potential source of competition. There 
are now just three companies operating in telecommunications, all listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.  
The rare earth industry is another sector where the government has been trying to reduce the number 
of producers. At present, half of the output of the industry is obtained as the by-product of iron ore 
extraction at one large mine in Inner Mongolia. The remainder of the industry is spread across southern 
China in over 100 mines. In 1996, China accounted for 43% of world reserves. By 2009, China accounted 
for 96% of world production (Long et al., 2010), as its production costs are low and its environmental 
controls poor. This high production rate has led to China’s share of world reserves falling to 30% of total 
world reserves by 2009. This movement has prompted concerns on the part of the Ministry of Commerce 
that current rates of production and exports are depleting national reserves which may be exhausted in 15 
to 20 years. As a result, the Ministry of Land and Resources cut the 2010 production quota by 25% and the 
Ministry of Commerce reduced the export quota. In addition, the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIIT) produced a development plan for the sector that resulted in the State Council 
announcing on September 6
th 2010 that the consolidation of the industry would be pursued actively though 
mergers and acquisitions. The objective of the plan is to reduce the number of companies operating in the 
area from 90 in 2010 to 20 by 2015. Fifteen cities in the producing areas of Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, 
Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, accounting for 38% of output, signed an agreement to jointly supervise and 
regulate rare earth mining. The cities aim to:  
•  strictly follow a quota system for developing rare earth minerals, 
•  establish an integrated rare earth market, 
•  create a union of rare earth mining companies in southern China, 
•  adopt better pricing and distribution mechanisms through negotiations, 
•  reduce the extent of illegal exports.  
 
The result of these production cuts and the related exports cuts (see below) has been a surge in world prices 
for these products (Figure 6).  
14 
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Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The State Council Guidelines, announced on September 6
th 2010, also focussed on consolidating the 
automobile, steel, aluminium cement and machinery manufacturing industries. Other sectors that are 
covered, but not specifically mentioned by the  Guidelines  include coal, non-ferrous metal and ship 
manufacturing.  The Guidelines  state that local governments should respect the will of the companies, 
follow market rules and not promote mergers of enterprises irresponsibly or arbitrarily. The new policy 
also requires the Central Bank, the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Land and 
Resources to support the reorganisation of SOEs by ensuring that there is an adequate flow of bonds; 
sufficient bank loans to provide capital and merger loans and offering land to facilitate mergers. In the steel 
industry, the pursuit of consolidation was a major feature of the 2009 stimulus plan for the industry, but 
plans have not yet been as successful as expected because private steel companies have resisted being 
merged into SOEs. However, in a number of provinces, privately-owned coal mines have been merged into 
state-controlled enterprises. While the new Guidelines remove bans on cross-province mergers, these are 
proving difficult to achieve. Most of the plans are being implemented by provincial governments and they 
are reluctant to share tax revenues with other provinces. In the aluminium industry, the government has 
been trying to consolidate the industry since 2006. Local governments have to report their plans for 
consolidation of these industries to the MIIT which hopes to increase industry concentration ratios by 
2015. 
SOE governance has been comprehensively reformed 
15 
Prior to reform, public enterprises were essentially government bureaus producing under the direct 
control of the line ministries. Pay and conditions of staff were sent according to civil service scales, though 
progressively in the 1980s and 1990s, pricing became market-oriented. Over recent years, reflecting a 
strong commitment to improving the performance of the state-enterprise sector, SOE governance has been 
comprehensively reformed. Early reforms included corporatising SOEs and increasing managerial 
independence by delegating decision making from supervisory government bureaus to SOE management. 
More recently, as part of ongoing efforts to separate the ownership function from other aspects of 
government policymaking, the ad hoc  institutional structures that oversaw the major SOEs were 
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centralised in 2003. The newly-created State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) was given the primary mandate of exercising the government’s ownership rights in state assets, 
including overseeing SOE restructuring.
8 
With the objective of creating internationally competitive firms large enough to join the ranks of the 
global Fortune 500, SASAC has progressively overseen a number of mergers and currently supervises 
141 SOEs, down from 196 at its inception.
9
 Many of the larger companies in SASAC’s portfolio were 
converted from the industrial ministries and operate as holding companies with a large number of 
subsidiaries. Collectively, SOEs under SASAC control at the central level employ around 8.5 million 
workers, implying an average firm size of more than 50  000 employees. SASAC plans further 
consolidation and aims to reduce the number of SOEs at the central level to between 80 and 100 by 2010. 
To speed up this process, SASAC has recently announced the formation of asset management companies 
to administer some of the smaller and underperforming SOEs. 
As well as operating at the central level, a number of provinces and municipalities have also 
established local-level SASAC branches to oversee SOEs owned by lower levels of government, 
significantly helping to clarify local control over local SOEs. In terms of capital employed, the local state 
enterprise sector is about as big as the central state sector but employs around 75% of the total SOE 
workforce. 
The introduction of SASAC marked the beginning of a new phase in SOE governance during which 
corporatisation was accelerated and a number of reforms aimed at improving governance implemented.
10
 
In many cases, SASAC is fulfilling an ownership function that had not always been fully legally exercised 
by government in the past, with negative implications for management incentives and monitoring. In 
addition, the overriding theme of recent reforms has been to lessen the Government’s direct involvement in 
SOEs. Boards of directors have been introduced in most SOEs, including independent directors, along with 
clearer corporate structures. SASAC has also strengthened managerial incentives by introducing 
monitoring systems and contracts that link the salaries of SOE management to performance.  
With improved governance and other reforms, SOEs are, in some ways, operating more like 
private-sector firms. In the past, SOEs tended to carry larger inventories compared to private firms, 
perhaps reflecting greater access to credit and less exposure to competition (Table  4). However, this 
differential has fallen over recent years as the onus on SOE management to become more efficient and 
profitable has increased. In addition, government subsidies have heavily favoured SOEs in the past but this 
gap has also closed over recent years, reflecting the government’s commitment, made as part of China’s 
bid for WTO membership, to substantially reduce subsidies to the state enterprise sector. 
In other important ways, however, China’s SOEs still differ substantially from their private sector 
counterparts. First and foremost, as well as being larger, SOEs are much more capital-intensive. Since the 
late 1990s, capital employed per worker in the state-enterprise sector has increased enormously and is now 
16 
                                                            
8 .  SASAC is a ministerial-level “special organisation” reporting directly to the Sate Council. Its mandate does 
not extent to the financial sector where the ownership role is performed by the Central Huijin Investment 
Company and supervision is the responsibility of the Central Banking Supervisory Committee. 
9 .  The Chinese government aims to increase the number of Chinese firms listed in Global Fortune 500 to 
around 50 by 2015, up from 37 in 2009. In 1995, only 3 Chinese companies were in the Global Fortune 
500. 
10 .  At end 2006, the process of corporatising the SOEs was approaching completion with more than 80% of all 
SOEs, and virtually all of those controlled by the central government, incorporated under the Company 
Law (OECD, 2009). 
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almost four times greater than in the private sector. As well as reflecting the intrinsic nature of the sectors 
in which SOEs have become increasingly concentrated, this may also be indicative of a lingering lending 
bias towards SOEs in the predominantly state-owned banking sector (OECD, 2010). Indeed, the share of 
long-term liabilities in total assets is almost 2.5 times larger in SOEs compared to private firms, indicative 
of preferential access to bank financing. Finally, private firms, particularly those owned by non-mainland 
investors, are much more likely to export than state-controlled firms. 
Table 4. Comparison of SOEs and private firms in the industrial sector 
    1998 2003 2007 
Employment    Average number of employees        
Public sector    662.1 716.8 887.9 
Non-state sector    250.0 229.0 200.0 
Capital intensity
   000 yuan per employee     
Public sector    82.2 193.5  364 
Non-state sector    51.6 68.1 97.7 
Inventory  % of annual sales      
Public sector    27.2 16.2 12.6 
Non-state sector    19.7 13.5 11.0 
Long-term liabilities  % of total assets     
Public sector    22.2 19.1 17.1 
Non-state sector    11.3 8  6.9 
Exports  % of total exports by sector      
Public sector    25.7 13.7  9.8 
Non-state sector    74.3 86.3 90.2 
Subsidies  % of value added     
Public sector    2.1 1.5 0.8 
Non-state sector    0.6 0.9 0.7 
Source: Joint NBS-OECD Analysis. 
SOE performance has improved but still lags the private sector 
The overall productivity of state-owned or controlled companies remains well below that of privately 
controlled companies despite evidence that their productivity has increased in recent years. This holds even 
when allowing for the different industries and the varying location of private and state-owned companies 
and differences in size (Figure 7).
11 This is consistent with the results presented in (Dougherty et al., 2007) 
and many other studies that use a wide range of methodologies. Between 2004 and 2007, total factor 
productivity (TFP) in the state-owned sector started to catch up with that in the state-enterprise sector 
relative to the private sector: while TFP in the state-enterprise sector averaged half that of the private sector 
over 1997-2003, it rose to close to two thirds in 2004-07. Underscoring the benefits that even partial 
privatisation can bring, industrial firms with state ownership of less than 50% are around 40% more 
productive than fully-state-owned firms. Lower productivity in the SOEs is systemic across China’s 
industrial sector and does not simply reflect regional and sectoral differences. 
                                                            
11 .  Technical details of the estimated production function underlying the results presented in Figure 7 are 
given in the Annex. 
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Figure 7. Differences in total factor productivity by firm ownership
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1 Technical details of the model underlying these results are given in the Annex. The 95% confidence interval is shown by the 
thickness of the bar.  
Source: Joint NBS-OECD analysis.  
This pattern of relatively high labour productivity and low TFP indicates that SOEs use their capital 
stock less efficiently than private sector firms. With capital accumulation a key driver of GDP growth and 
SOEs responsible for a large share of total investment, low capital productivity in the state enterprise sector 
amounts to a significant drag on economic growth. For instance, Dollar and Wei (2007) find that systemic 
distortions in capital allocation arising from government ownership have a large negative impact on GDP. 
According to their simulations, if capital were allocated more efficiently, total investment could fall by 5% 
of GDP without any sacrifice of economic growth. 
18 
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Reflecting the productivity results, the rate of return on assets employed by the state enterprise sector 
has significantly improved over recent years but still lags that of the private sector. In the mid-1990s, the 
entire public enterprise sector only just broke even as a plethora of technically insolvent SOEs cancelled 
out most of the profits of the SOEs in better financial health. Since then, the state enterprise sector has 
moved strongly into profitability with the average return on the assets of industrial-sector SOEs increasing 
almost ten-fold from 2.2% in 1998 to 21% in 2007.
12  
This impressive profitability improvement has not been even across all state-controlled firms, with the 
largest gains occurring at the upper end of the distribution – from 1998 to 2007, 90% of the improvement 
in returns was generated by the top 30% of SOEs (Figure 8). Indeed, much of the resurgence in SOE 
profitability is explained by a relatively small number of central SOEs operating in resource extraction and 
processing sectors which experienced a period of unprecedented demand that massively boosted 
commodity prices. Although the best-performing SOEs earn the bulk of profits, there has been some 
improvement across the distribution and the median return for industrial SOEs increased from only 1.1% to 
5.5% between 1998 and 2007. In no small part, this reflects reforms enacted at the firm level to restructure 
and rehabilitate unprofitable SOEs as well as a raft of bankruptcies that closed thousands of loss-making 
SOEs. 
In spite of these positive developments, many of the smaller SOEs still make losses or barely break 
even – in 2007 one in five SOEs earned a negative return. State enterprises under provincial and local 
SASACs have also increased profitability, but still lag behind the central SOEs. Overall, SOEs typically 
continue to be less profitable than private-sector firms in the same region and industry. 
Figure 8. Distribution of rates of return on physical assets 
 
Source: Joint NBS-OECD analysis. 
                                                            
12 .  There was a temporary reversal of firtunes in 2008, when related to the global recession, the profits of the 
central SOEs fell by 30%, the first decline since 2002. Profits rebounded, however in 2010. 
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Detailed PMR indicator results and policy recommendations 
The paradox of China’s stellar economic performance over the reform period is that it has occurred 
while the transformation of institutions is still far from complete and aspects of the regulatory environment 
continue to bear some of the hallmarks of the planning era. Indeed, the overall PMR indicator reported in 
Figure 2 above points to a regulatory environment that is significantly less conducive to competition than 
in OECD countries, suggesting that institutional development has, in some ways, lagged behind China’s 
economic transformation. It would seem that the benefits of the substantial reforms that have been put in 
place as well as the rise of the private sector – in conjunction with “creative improvisation” to bridge 
institutional gaps – have so far outweighed the costs implicit in the remaining policy-induced distortions 
(Brandt and Rawski, 2008).
13 
Going forward, the regulatory impediments implicit in the current framework are increasingly likely 
to constrain growth as the Chinese economy continues to develop and becomes more sophisticated. In what 
follows, the mid and low-level PMR indicators are used to identify regulatory areas where China’s policy 
environment lags even the worst-performing OECD countries and which therefore offer the greatest scope 
for reforms to boost economic performance. The discussion is ordered according to the three broad 
regulatory areas summarised by the PMR indicators – state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and 
barriers to international trade and investment. 
State control is still pervasive compared with OECD countries 
Despite rapid privatisation and widespread improvements in SOE governance, the extent of state 
control in the Chinese economy is, according to the PMR indicators, still higher than in any OECD country 
(Table  5). This arises from a high degree of both public ownership and government involvement in 
business operations. As mentioned above, these indicators do not take into account the impact of recent 
policy statements such as the State Council's “Several Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy 
Development of Private Investment” issued in May 2010. The policy aims at facilitating the raising of 
private capital. Cross-region and cross-industry mergers, acquisitions and re-organisations will be 
launched, while the proportion of state-owned capital in state-controlled enterprises will be reduced. One 
of the objectives is to open up sectors such as telecommunications, banking and electricity to private 
investment. These sectors have, to date, been dominated by public enterprises.  
20 
                                                            
13 .    As well as a legacy of competitive markets, a number of other potential explanations for China’s strong 
economic performance given institutional shortcomings have been proposed. Rawski and Rawski (2008) 
argue that historical and cultural factors have endowed the Chinese population with a rich and flexible 
portfolio of organisational skills well suited to entrepreneurial development. Knowledge transfers from 
foreign firms, which entered early in the reform process, and the influence of the overseas Chinese 
community may also be part of the reason productivity growth has been strong despite weaknesses in the 
regulatory framework. 
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Table 5. State control in China, international comparison 












Overall PMR indicator  3.30 3.30 1.34 1.83 1.32 0.84 
State control  4.63 4.39 2.03 2.54 2.19 1.10 
Public ownership  5.33  4.28 2.91 3.46 3.08 1.30 
Scope of public enterprise sector  6.00 4.64 3.10 3.54 3.23 2.25 
Direct control over business enterprises  4.50 4.19 2.86 3.67 2.93 0.68 
Government control in infrastructure sectors  5.48 4.02 2.76 3.18 3.08 0.99 
Involvement in business operations  3.94 4.50 1.15 1.61 1.30 0.90 
Use of command and control regulation  3.50 4.00 1.52 1.94 1.88 1.30 
Price controls  4.38  5.00 0.78 1.29 0.71 0.50 
1   Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Turkey. 
2  Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulations database. 
SOEs still dominate some sectors 
In December 2006, SASAC issued a policy directive unveiling plans to maintain absolute control 
through sole ownership or an absolute controlling stake in SOEs operating in seven sectors declared to be 
“strategic” – that is, defence, electrical power and distribution, oil and chemicals, telecommunications, 
coal, civil aviation and shipping (Table 6). In addition, the government also aims to maintain significant 
absolute or relative controlling stakes in a range of sectors described as “basic or pillar industries”. This 
marked a shift in policy away from encouraging private-sector involvement in all competitive sectors of 
the economy to one of privatising smaller SOEs in non-strategic sectors while increasing state ownership 
in enterprises deemed to be strategic. This is consistent with the approach first expressed in the 
9
th Five-Year Plan of “grasp the big, let go of the small”. 
Table 6. Policy goals on state ownership across sectors 
Description Sectors  Ownership  goal 
Strategic and key  Defence, power generation and 
distribution, oil and petrochem, 
telecom, coal, civil aviation, shipping 
Maintaining 100% state ownership or 
absolute control; increasing 
state-owned assets in these sectors 
Basic and piller industries  Machinery, auto, IT, construction, 
steel, base metals, chemicals, land 
surveying, R&D 
Absolute or conditional relative 
controlling stake; enhancing the 
influence of state ownership even as 
the ownership share is reduced 
where appropriate 
Other industries  Trading, investment, medicine, 
construction materials, agriculture, 
geological exploration 
Maintaining necessary influence by 
controlling stakes in key companies; 
in non-key companies stage 
ownership will be clearly reduced 
Source: Mattlin (2007).  
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In line with this policy, SOEs continue to dominate some key sectors. In particular, the upstream 
extraction and production of natural resources (oil, gas, coal and some ores) as well as large-scale 
machinery building are subject to a large SOE presence. State-run firms also control a number of the 
network sectors, particularly electricity generation and distribution, natural gas and water. In some of these 
sectors the share of value added produced by SOEs has declined very little since the late 1990s (Table 7). 
Outside of the industrial sector, SOEs continue to dominate banking, telecommunications and the media.  











 1998  2003  2007  2007 
Manufacture of tobacco  98.9 99.3  99.8  99.2 95.5  78.6 
Extraction of petroleum and natural gas  99.9  93.9  97.2 97.0  97.7  50.6 
Production and supply of electric power and heat power  87.5  84.0 88.6  87.9  87.6  62.4 
Production and supply of water  95.4 86.1  68.2  82.1 86.2  70.4 
Mining and washing of coal  83.3 80.8  66.5  80.8 70.0  11.2 
Processing of petroleum, coking, etc. 87.5  81.0  62.3 68.5  50.0  10.3 
Manufacture of transport equipment 69.3  64.6  48.9 55.3  37.1  9.5 
Production and supply of gas  82.7 74.9  46.2  61.0 65.8  36.8 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous  metals  78.7 66.0  45.4  61.2 43.9  4.6 
Mining and processing of non-ferrous metal ores  57.1  44.5 34.6  45.4  41.9  14.1 
Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous  metals  58.5 48.1  34.1  47.2 36.3  6.5 
Source: Joint NBS-OECD analysis. 
In less capital-intensive industries the SOE share of value added is typically much lower and declining 
(Figure  9). However, despite the increasing concentration of state enterprises in sectors deemed to be 
strategic, SOEs continue to operate in all industrial sectors at the 2-digit level, as evidenced by the 
maximum value for the PMR indicator of the scope of public enterprise sector (Table 5 above). Such an 
indicator may, however, overstate the influence of state-owned companies in the economy, as while state 
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SOE governance needs to be improved further 
Given the prevalence of SOEs in key sectors of the Chinese economy, overcoming weaknesses in 
corporate governance under state ownership is a key issue. An overriding theme of recent reforms in this 
area has been to lessen the government’s direct control over SOEs by allowing them to operate in their 
commercial interests while at the same time maintaining proper and efficient supervision. As detailed in 
the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (OECD, 2005b), priority 
areas include: 
•  ensuring a level playing field with the private sector; 
•  improving the transparency of SOEs objectives and performance; 
•  strengthening and empowering SOE boards; 
•  reinforcing the ownership function within the state administration; 
•  providing equitable treatment of minority shareholders. 
Although important steps have been taken along these lines, high PMR indicator values for direct 
control over business operations and government control in infrastructure sectors suggest that the line 
between government and the SOEs is still blurred. This indicates that SOE decisions still sometimes reflect 
the government’s intentions, rather than purely commercial goals. Further reform and better 
implementation of existing policies is necessary to encourage greater commercialisation of the SOEs and 
improve competition. 
23 
Decisively cutting the traditional ties between SOEs, government agencies and the Communist Party 
is an ongoing challenge for SOE governance in China. This is proving difficult given that almost half of 
the chairpersons and more than one third of chief executive officers of central SOEs were appointed by the 
Central Organisation Department of the Communist Party and have civil servant status (Hu, 2007). In 
addition, party committees in SOEs imbue corporate governance with party principles and often play an 
active role in human resources and the strategic decision making of the enterprise. 
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If SASAC is to achieve its original intention of separating government ownership from policymaking 
and regulation, then its supervisory role needs to be clearly defined and adhered to.
14
 The core business of 
SASAC should involve monitoring SOE performance and planning, participating in shareholder meetings, 
appointing SOE directors, and periodically organising and monitoring sales of SOE shares. Strategic 
decisions on human resources, budgets and investment strategies should be left in the hands of the SOEs 
and the government’s ownership role should not be used to pursue the objectives of industrial policy. 
Government interference in corporate operations outside its scope of responsibility as capital provider has 
a negative impact on competition and runs contrary to the original principles on which SASAC is based. 
Experience in other countries indicates that mixing regulatory and ownership functions tends to degrade 
the quality of both. 
Another ongoing challenge for SOE governance in China is to eliminate investment distortions arising 
from government ownership. Increasing the share of SOE profits paid as dividends would help in this 
regard. Instead of paying dividends, SOEs have generally ploughed increasing profits back into 
investments that have in some cases been undisciplined and contributed to a pattern of “boom and bust” 
investment cycles.
15
  SASAC has been working to change this and since 2008 has required SOEs to 
distribute part of their profits as dividends. Although this is a useful start, the prescribed dividend rates are 
low by OECD norms and should be increased.
16
 Larger SOEs also need to put formal dividend policies in 
place that return to shareholders surplus earnings on which management cannot expect to earn an adequate 
risk-adjusted return.  
In 2005, SASAC announced its intention to introduce a “state assets management budget” to 
consolidate the investment funds of the central SOEs. Under this scheme, SOE dividends are remitted to 
SASAC which then allocates them in line with the government’s industrial policy. This risks merely 
transferring the inefficiencies inherent in a non-market based approach to capital formation to SASAC. 
Instead, SOE dividends and privatisation proceeds should be paid directly to the Ministry of Finance and 
integrated into the budgeting process, as is standard practise in OECD countries. 
SOE governance could also benefit from better implementation and increased enforcement of reforms 
that are already in place. For example, information disclosure and transparency of the SOEs lags behind 
existing rules and standards. SASAC’s plan to require all 141 SOEs under its control to publish annual 
reports from 2008 should improve transparency and help untangle the opaque mass of cross shareholdings 
between a number of the middle-tier SOEs and their subordinate firms. Although being strengthened, 
limited protection for minority shareholders also diminishes the effectiveness of the governance structures 
in promoting the interests of all owners (OECD, 2008). 
24 
                                                            
14 .  This is the intention behind the “State-owned Assets Law of the People’s Republic of China”, which came 
into force in May 2009 after ten years of deliberation. Prior to this law, SOE policies were governed by the 
“Interim Measures for the Transfer of Enterprise State-owned Property Rights”, issued in December 2003. 
15 .  During the planning era the financing needs and profits of the SOEs were included as part of the state 
budget with more than half of the government’s budget revenues in the late 1970s being generated by 
SOEs. The government stopped collecting dividends from SOEs in 1994 because their profitability was so 
weak that it was considered better for the SOEs to retain profits so as to strengthen incentives. 
16 .  SOEs operating in the tobacco, petrochemicals, coal, electricity and telecommunications sectors are 
required to pay out 10% of gross profits as dividends. For SOEs in the steel, transport, electronics and retail 
trade sectors the analogous figure is 5% while SOEs in the defence sector and state-owned R&D 
institutions will continue to be exempt from dividend payments. 
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Policymakers need to focus on setting framework conditions 
A corollary of increased SOE independence in strategic decision making is that Chinese policymakers 
need to increasingly focus on setting framework conditions for private sector activity and maintaining an 
arm’s length relationship between the state and market. Organisational and administrative reforms taken 
over the past decade have considerably improved the capacity of the central government to effectively 
regulate a market-based economy. The 2003 government reorganisation, during which the industrial 
ministries  –  once the core of the planned economy  –  were abolished, marked a decisive shift towards 
market-based regulation. However, although policymaking has moved a long way from the previous 
system of open economic interventions, the PMR indicators still imply a degree of command and control 
type regulation that is higher than in most OECD countries, implying that further progress would be 
beneficial for competition. 
There is empirical evidence from China that creating a good institutional environment improves the 
performance of companies through increasing outlays on research and development (R&D). This can be 
seen by comparing the business environment in different cities in China across several dimensions 
(Lin et al., 2010). In particular, the extent to which entrepreneurs felt that contracts were enforceable at a 
local level and the extent to which local governments were felt to encourage business (as opposed to acting 
in a predatory fashion) both raised the R&D effort of local firms, while the direct appointment of the CEOs 
of local SOEs by the government adversely impacted on R&D.  
25 
latest adjustment date.  
Privatisation is the best cure 
llow 
SASAC to focus on ownership oversight and transfer its regulatory responsibilities to other agencies. 
                                                           
Reflecting the lingering tendency for command and control regulation, price controls are, according 
to the PMR indicators, used to a much greater degree in China than in any OECD country.
17
 
Policy-induced price distortions can stifle industry development and impose major costs through inefficient 
resource allocation. Price controls continue to be applied to a range of goods in China including oil and 
natural gas, electricity, water, tobacco, and grains and petroleum products. In May 2010, the government 
moved the regulation of petroleum prices closer to a market basis by allowing a price change if 
international crude oil prices have moved, on average over a period of 22 days, by more than 4% since the 
Revitalising the privatisation process is the ultimate way of ensuring that SOEs operate on 
commercial grounds and ending the harmful practice of state-owned banks skewing lending towards the 
state enterprise sector. The rolling back of the state enterprise sector and rise of the private sector has been 
at the epicentre of China’s economic reforms over the past 30 years and a key driver of improvements in 
capital allocation and TFP. This has also been the experience in many developed and developing countries 
in which privatisation has been found to improve firm profitability, real output and efficiency 
(e.g. Megginson and Netter, 2001; Kikeri and Nellis, 2004). In the case of China, further reductions in the 
scope of state ownership would help minimise government interference in business decisions and a
When privatisation began in the 1990s, the Chinese government instigated a two-tier structure under 
which its original equity formed a class of non-tradable shares distinct from new equity. Although both 
 
17 .  Price controls are established under the Pricing Law and set by the NDRC at the central level and by the 
Bureau of Commodity Pricing in each province. Government prices are fixed prices whereas government 
guidance prices are usually set as a basic price, and a range within which prices can fluctuate. In 2006, 




able to sell the share fo  in principle.  
Figure 10. Proportion of non-tradable shares becoming tradable 
share types had the same profit and voting rights in principle, the state’s non-tradable shares were designed 
to be held in perpetuity and could not be sold on public markets.
18
 In 2005, concerned by the negative 
impact of non-traded shares on the development of equity markets and corporate governance, the 
government abandoned this policy and required SOEs to implement plans to merge the two share classes.
19
 
On current plans, all SOE shares are due to become fully tradable by 2012 .This reform has entailed a 
number of important benefits including improving corporate governance and liquidity in China’s capital 
markets. The reform has been particularly important in improving the share price of smaller companies, 
those with Chinese auditors and those where the turnover was low (Beltratti et al., 2010). While nearly all 
of the restructuring plans were completed by 2006, the owners of the newly transferable shares we
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ares are concentrated in 10 large companies which are regarded as strategic enterprises by the 
government. 
                                                           
e: Yeung (2009). 
The reform should make mergers and acquisitions of listed companies easier to undertake. It might 
also allow SASAC to consolidate and simplify the government’s SOE portfolio. It also removes a 
significant barrier to privatisation, although several government agencies have stated that the objective of 
the reform is not to reduce state holdings, only to make non-tradable shares tradable. For example,one 
state-owned company holding a controlling interest in a company might sell the stake to another 
state-owned company. Moreover, the impact on ownership is likely to be limited as almost 60% of the 
non-traded sh
 
18  .  Until 2005, around two-thirds of the shares on China’s equity markets were non-tradable. These 
non-tradable shares can be exchanged outside of the market in a number of ways including: arranged sale, 
indirect takeover, free or judicial transfer, or entrusted shares (Mattlin, 2007). Transactions involving 
non-traded shares have to be approved by SASAC. 
19 .  The specifics of the merger were left to the discretion of the company, provided it was supported by two 
thirds of tradable and non-tradable shareholders. These plans generally involved holders of non-tradable 
shares compensating tradable shareholders to offset the negative impact of a flood of shares on the market 
price. A consensus emerged that tradable shareholders receive a bonus, usually paid in equity, worth 30% 
of their stake. 
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Notwithstanding the benefits of privatisation, increasing concentration of state ownership in large 
companies has seen the stock market capitalisation of China’s SOEs increase markedly over recent years. 
Currently, SOEs that have been corporatised and partially privatised account for well over 80% of market 
capitalisation. Although partial privatisation can improve firm performance, cross-country studies in 
OECD countries indicate that the gains in profitability and productivity are typically larger in firms that are 
fully privatised (OECD, 2003). This is echoed in the firm-level performance results across different 
ownership classes reported above. The disadvantage of partial privatisation is that it usually does not result 
in management control being passed to private owners or an infusion of new technology necessary to 
improve firm performance to that of the private sector. If China is to maintain high rates of economic 
growth driven by productivity improvements, the share of productive assets controlled by profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs and managers must continue to increase. 
First, and perhaps most easily, government-owned equity in small SOEs in non-strategic sectors could 
be disposed of through public auctions to the highest bidder. Indeed, SASAC’s designation of strategic 
sectors leaves a lot of ground from which the government has effectively announced that it intends to 
withdraw completely. Many of these smaller SOEs are loss-making and non-transparent, implying 
additional liability risks. They also typically operate in sectors in which competition is robust. In addition, 
as discussed below, a sound competition framework has recently been introduced, implying minimal risk 
in privatising these SOEs. As such, the government needs to follow through on its decision to “let go of the 
small”. 
The list of “strategic” and “basic or pillar” industries also needs to be reviewed. All of the sectors 
included in the latter category are inherently competitive and typically not subjected to high rates of 
government ownership in OECD countries. Along with foreign firms, private sector enterprises in China 
now have the financial capacity to acquire large SOEs or significant parts of their equity.
20
 Similarly, all of 
the network sectors deemed to be “strategic” by SASAC have competitive subsectors in which 
participation by private firms has led to impressive gains in productivity in both developed and developing 
countries. In the non-competitive segments of the network sectors, as discussed below, an effective 
regulatory regime and oversight by independent regulators is required prior to privatisation.  
Further privatisation of China’s SOEs would necessitate a large number of transactions, implying a 
need for an efficient method of disposal. In the past, many ownership transfers to the private sector have 
been conducted through management-employee buyouts that have been closed to outside scrutiny and 
ultimately controversial, with widespread reports of asset stripping. These issues have been addressed with 
the passing of the “State-owned Assets Law” which establishes in legislation a number of principles for the 
transfer of state assets via management buyouts including an appraisal prior to the sale. This law also gives 
SASAC the power to terminate an asset transfer or declare it invalid if it considers malicious collusion to 
have occurred. This sends a clear warning signal that this issue is of high importance to law makers. 
Timely and proper enforcement of these new regulations will be key to ensuring that they change market 
practices. The OECD experience has been that more open processes of asset transfer are more beneficial 
for the state and enterprise concerned (OECD, 2003). In addition, “golden shares”, which allow the state to 
exercise a level of control beyond the level of risk implied by its ownership stake, carry the potential for 
abuse and should be avoided. 
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20 .  This has not always been the case and there have been examples of private firms being unable to manage 
large complex SOEs in the past. For example, D’Long Group acquired four listed SOEs beginning in the 
late 1990s. As monetary policy tightened in early 2004, the group failed under the weight of excessive debt 
leaving debts of approximately CNY 10 billion. 
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Barriers to entrepreneurship restrict private sector development 
Low  barriers to entrepreneurship are critical for encouraging private sector firms and creating 
competitive markets. China performs well in some of the regulatory areas covered by this indicator 
(Table 8). In particular, the indicator of regulatory and administrative opacity is below the OECD average, 
reflecting progress in improving the transparency of the regulatory system. Despite these efforts, however, 
the administrative burden that the government places on entrepreneurs is still very high and acts as an 
obstacle to entry, implying that efforts to improve the government bureaucracy are yet to pay significant 
dividends.  Barriers to competition are also high compared to OECD countries, reflecting ongoing 
regulatory challenges in network and service sectors. 
Table 8. Barriers to entrepreneurship in China, international comparison 












Barriers to entrepreneurship  2.9 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.2 
Regulatory and administrative opacity  0.3 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.2 
Licenses and permit system  0.0 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.2 0.0 
Communication  and  simplification  of  rules        
 and  procedures  0.5  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 
Administrative burdens on start  ups  5.6 3.3 1.5 2.7 1.6 1.0 
Administrative burdens for corporations 5.2  3.5  1.6 2.8 1.6 0.8 
Administrative  burdens  for  sole  proprietor          
  firms  5.5 4.0 1.6 2.7 1.8 1.2 
Sector-specific administrative burdens  6.0 2.3 1.4 2.6 1.5 1.0 
Barriers to competition  2.8 2.9 1.7 1.9 1.5 2.5 
Legal  barriers  1.4 2.0 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.1 
Antitrust exemptions  0.00 4.6 0.5 0.6 0.0 2.3 
Barriers to entry in network sectors  5.4 2.2 1.9 2.3 1.7 3.1 
Barrier to entry in services  4.5 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.6 
1   Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Turkey. 
2   Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation database. 
Regulatory and administrative transparency has improved but administrative burdens remain 
excessive 
Major efforts to reform China’s systems of administrative governance and promote regulatory 
transparency have been an important part of the reform process (OECD, 2009). Most recently, the 
“Regulations on Open Government Information”, which came into force in May 2008, provide a legal 
basis for China’s first nationwide information disclosure system applicable at all levels of government. 
Increasing the transparency of public sector institutions will act as a powerful incentive for institutional 
reform and strengthen accountability and efficiency. The quality of legal drafting has also improved but is 
still less than plain language, with a tendency towards principle-like pronouncements that increase 
uncertainty over market rules. Public consultation on new regulations has increased and, although not 
legally required at present, has been included in recent rules for drafting regulations.  
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Beginning in 2001, major efforts have also been directed at administrative simplification. A number 
of programmes have been implemented with the aim of reducing the scope and impact of regulatory 
requirements inherited from the central planning era and curbing widespread bureaucratic fragmentation. 
Although internet penetration remains low outside of the urban areas, an ambitious e-government 
programme is also being promoted as part of broader reforms in law and administrative institutions. As a 
result of these and other initiatives, China has been improving regulatory transparency and open access to 
government information and the indicators of regulatory and administrative opacity compare favourably 
internationally. The indicator of the licence and permits system is also low, given the introduction of 
“one-stop shops” and other initiatives designed to reduce red tape and simplify the rules and procedures 
that enterprises must comply with. 
Despite efforts to improve the functioning of the public bureaucracy, administrative burdens on 
start-ups  remain high compared with other countries, implying elaborate and cumbersome systems of 
administrative approval.
21
  These high indicator values could also be indicative of more widespread 
inefficiencies in government administration and suggest that barriers to entrepreneurship stem not so much 
from formal regulations but in large part from difficulties in implementation. Recent attempts at 
administrative reform have repeatedly run up against certain intransigent aspects of the existing system 
and, as a result, China continues to have a complex array of institutions and agencies with varying degrees 
of legal power to make and administer new regulations. This allows government bureaucrats to make 
decisions that should be left to the market and creates corruption opportunities that serve as powerful 
incentives to block reform. 
With an interventionist tradition and administrative structures that in many cases have not kept pace 
with economic liberalisation and are highly fragmented, a significant re-engineering of administrative 
processes is needed to improve service delivery and simplify the interaction between government and 
firms. The OECD experience has been that a long-term strategy for regulatory reform needs to be explicit, 
coherent and supported by the highest levels of government. Recognising the scope of this challenge, most 
OECD governments have established regulatory oversight bodies with “whole-of-government” 
responsibility for regulatory policy to promote consistent reform across the entire administration. In China, 
although the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council assumes some responsibility for regulatory 
quality, there is currently no centralised oversight body charged with reviewing regulatory proposals to 
ensure they do not impose unnecessary or unreasonable administrative burdens on firms and citizens.
22 
This would involve the use of regulatory impact analysis, which is a process of evidence-based decision 
making designed to ensure regulatory quality. An oversight body could also help integrate regulatory 
functions across different levels of government, thereby ensuring that progress in regulatory reform is more 
uniform across the country. 
Internal markets have been liberalised but SOEs still restrict entry in some sectors  
In 2005 the State Council issued “Guidelines on Encouraging and Supporting the Development of the 
Non-Public Sector including Individual and Private Enterprises” with the intention of enhancing market 
access for private firms in previously restricted industries. As noted, these guidelines were strengthened 
and updated in May 2010. Along with market-opening commitments made as part of China’s WTO entry, 
the 2005 guidelines opened a number of sectors to non-state competition and moved a long way towards 
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21 .  The World Bank’s Doing Business 2011 indicators, which also assess administrative burdens on start-ups, 
placed China at the 70
th percentile of the countries surveyed in 2010 compared to the 69
th percentile in 
2006. 
22 .  Note, however, that the “Legislation Law” does endorse a more open and consultative legislative process. 
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creating a level playing field. As a result, formal legal barriers to entry are, according to the PMR 
indicators, broadly comparable to those in OECD emerging markets.  
As noted above, with the retreat of the state-enterprise sector and rise of private enterprise, fierce 
competition has developed in many industries, particularly labour-intensive sectors. However, in a number 
of the “strategic” and “pillar” sectors where SOEs have become increasingly concentrated, private-sector 
participation is much more limited or non-existent, with negative implications for market competition 
(Table  2 above and Figure  11). Although some of these sectors are technically open to private firms, 
discriminatory regulatory treatment is often used to discourage non-state entrants. In addition, the 
government’s explicit expectation that SOEs dominate these sectors acts as a powerful disincentive to 
entry. 
Figure 11. SOE penetration and market concentration, 1998-2007
1 
 
1 Market concentration is calculated as the un-weighted average of HHI scores at the 4-digit sectoral level.  
Source: NBS and OECD. 
The lack of competitive pressures in sectors dominated by state enterprises detracts from performance 
and increases the risk that SOEs will again become a major drain on public finances. Short of privatisation, 
increased private sector participation and competition in these sectors is necessary to ensure that incumbent 
SOEs strive to improve efficiency. Ensuring that the 2005 Guidelines on private sector participation are 
effectively implemented would go a long way towards removing implicit barriers to entry in “strategic” 
sectors. Rules discriminating against private companies need to be rescinded while access to bank, equity 
and bond financing for private-sector firms needs to be improved. Government procurement also needs to 
be made neutral between private and public enterprises, as required under the new Anti-Monopoly Law. 
The new competition law is a big step forward
23 
The new Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) entered into force in April 2008 and addresses many of the gaps 
and other weaknesses in the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law. Key regulations concerning the 
definitions of markets and the thresholds for reporting mergers were announced in 2009.The AML aligns 
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23 .  See OECD (2009) for a comprehensive review of the AML. 
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China’s competition framework with international practices and is an important step forward in 
safeguarding product market competition. The new law provides an updated and comprehensive legal 
framework for dealing with mergers and combating a wide range of anticompetitive practices including 
monopoly agreements, abuse of market dominance and the concentration of business operators. 
Importantly, the AML also addresses abuses of competition by SOEs and state-mandated actions, hence 
the low PMR indicator value for antitrust exemptions. 
Implementation and judicial interpretation will be critical in ensuring that the new law performs as 
expected and resolving conflicts between competition considerations and China’s relatively activist 
industrial policy. For example, previous government directives calling for rationalisation and consolidation 
in sectors with overcapacity have involved agreements among firms that would be in conflict with the new 
AML.  
Enforcement of the AML is divided between the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the 
Ministry for Commerce and the National Development and Reform Commission. This is in contrast to 
typical arrangements in OECD countries where the implementation of competition law is typically vested 
in a single national competition body. The advantage of this approach is that it enhances information 
exchange and minimises outside interference in competition enforcement decisions. The new AML does, 
however, provide for the establishment of a State Anti-Monopoly Commission under the State Council, 
which should be given overall responsibility for competition law enforcement. 
Major regulatory challenges remain in network sectors 
Over the past decade China has made some progress in reforming the regulation of network sectors. In 
general, although the pace and scope has differed across sectors, the government has adopted a more 
liberal regulatory approach by vertically and horizontally unbundling state monopolies and mandating 
private-sector involvement in some sub-sectors. Despite some improvement, however, the PMR indicator 
of barriers to entry in network sectors is still high in China relative to comparator countries, implying that 
impediments to private sector involvement continue to restrict competition. In addition, the high value of 
the indicator of government involvement in network sectors implies that, despite the possibility of 
competition, SOEs continue to dominate. 
In the electricity sector, The State Power Corporation, which took over most of the assets of the 
Ministry of Power in the late 1990s, was unbundled into two transmission companies and five generators in 
2002. This, in conjunction with the 2002 Electricity Law allowing private-sector generation, was an 
important precondition for competition. In addition, The State Electricity Regulatory Commission began 
operating in 2003. Since these reforms, a number of private firms have entered the generation market and 
several regional wholesale electricity markets have been launched on a trial basis. 
Price setting in the electricity sector continues to be a source of inefficiency that exerts a drag on 
productivity. In generation, prices vary according to the generator’s costs on the basis of a cost-plus 
methodology. Although this may encourage investment, it provides no incentives for efficiency 
improvements. At the retail level, the failure of regulated prices to keep pace with cost changes has 
increased fiscal pressures and led to other serious recurring problems; in 2008, price controls on electricity 
prompted suppliers to reduce generation leading to blackouts in some areas. Artificially low energy prices 
also lead to energy wastage, to the detriment of the environment. Future pricing reforms are expected to 
allow wholesale markets to determine tariffs on the generation side while the government will regulate 
transmission and distribution prices along with prices for end users. However, specific details of these 
reforms and implementation timetables are yet to be published. More generally, the government has 
adopted a gradual approach to the reform of the energy sector, which is deemed to be strategic. However, it 
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remains to be seen whether this approach will be sufficient to address the challenges the sector faces, 
notably the tension between large and growing energy demand and environmental protection (IEA, 2006). 
Regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector has, to some extent, encouraged competition and 
produced impressive results. The Telecom Law, adopted in 2000, calls for the separation of policy, 
regulatory and management functions within government and prohibits monopolies. Leading 
telecommunication operators may not refuse requests for network connections and predatory pricing and 
unjustified cross-subsidies are prohibited. The rules are administered by the Ministry of Information 
Industry, which is the principal regulator of the telecoms industry. Since these reforms, China’s 
telecommunications network has become the largest and fastest growing in the world. There are, however, 
still a number of regulatory areas that need to be spelled out in new legislation. For example, the rules 
around licensing new entrants and third-party access to networks need to be clarified and made more 
transparent. 
Independent regulators have been introduced in a number of China’s network sectors. In some cases, 
however, they are subordinated to the ministry of the sector that they regulate or appointed on the basis of 
political connections, which limits their independence and reduces the scope for efficient markets with 
increased private sector participation. Independent regulators need to strike a balance between promoting 
efficiency gains and attracting investment while protecting consumers from potential monopolist abuses 
and firms from political interference. This is no easy task, especially in a country such as China with a 
large concentration of SOEs in a number of industries. To generate the expected benefits of a high-quality 
regulatory environment, independent regulators need to be based on proper institutional design within 
strong governance frameworks. Independence should go hand-in-hand with accountability, stability and 
expertise. Accountability requires that the decision-making process be transparent and subject to clear and 
simple procedural requirements and checks and balances, including opportunities for public hearings and 
appeal provisions. In OECD countries, regulators have been most effective and credible when their 
independence and roles are made explicit in a distinct statute with well-defined functions and objectives. 
Barriers to international trade and investment 
China has benefited enormously from its rapid integration into the global economy. Both international 
trade and foreign direct investment have encouraged domestic firms to incorporate foreign technologies 
into the production process, thereby facilitating technological diffusion and productivity growth. Although 
China has committed to further liberalisation of its trade and foreign direct investment regimes, the PMR 
indicator of barriers to trade and investment is high compared to OECD countries. This indicates that 
ongoing reforms to open sectors of the economy that are still sheltered from the global economy would pay 
additional dividends (Table 9). 
Greater FDI in the service sector would produce large benefits 
In contrast to tight restrictions on foreign portfolio investment, the Chinese government has actively 
encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) and China is now the largest recipient of FDI in the world. 
Notwithstanding this impressive performance, the indicator of foreign ownership barriers, which measures 
FDI barriers in service sectors, is relatively high. In addition, the share of Chinese investment funded by 




Table 9. Barriers to international trade and investment, international comparison 












Barriers to trade and investment  2.4 3.1 0.6  1.0  0.5  0.2 
Explicit barriers to trade and investment  2.5 2.6 1.0  1.7  0.9  0.4 
Foreign ownership barriers  3.2 3.5 1.3  1.7  1.4  1.1 
Discriminatory procedures  2.2 1.4 0.5  1.1  0.2  0.0 
Tariffs  2.0 3.0 1.1  2.3  1.0  0.0 
Other barriers  2.3  3.6 0.2  0.4  0.1  0.0 
Regulatory  barriers  2.3 3.6 0.2  0.4  0.1  0.0 
1   Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Turkey. 
2   Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 
Source: OECD Product Market Regulation database. 
These policy-induced barriers to FDI are reflected in the composition of inflows into China. Until the 
mid-2000s, FDI was heavily concentrated in manufacturing while services attracted far less foreign 
investment than in other developing countries (World Bank, 2007). More recently, driven in part by policy 
changes enacted as part of China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, the service-sector share of FDI has risen 
markedly, as the investment flows into the manufacturing sector falled to keep pace witht he growth of 
GDP (Figure 12). Much of this increase in FDI has been in the real estate and financial sectors while 
inflows into other service sectors have remained relatively modest.
24 
In broad terms, foreign service providers face three types of FDI barriers in China: i) restrictions on 
the form of ownership and ceilings on the maximum equity stake they may hold in domestic firms; 
ii) restrictions on the geographic scope and lines of business; and iii) other requirements, such as minimum 
capital requirements that are not imposed on domestic competitors or imposed to a lesser degree (OECD, 
2009). In some service sectors, barriers to FDI remain pervasive. For instance, foreign participants in the 
telecommunications and electricity sectors face ownership restrictions and are confined to value-added 
services and power generation respectively. Limitations on foreign participation also still exist in the 
maritime and air transport, legal and accounting, tourism, and postal sectors.
25
 These restrictions limit not 
only the market share of foreign providers, but also the breadth and sophistication of the services they 
provide, given a reluctance to transfer technology and expertise to firms where their control is limited. In 
addition to explicit barriers to FDI, regulatory policies that restrict market access in one way or another 
also negatively influence the share of FDI (see Nicoletti  et al., 2003 for the OECD experience). This 
suggests that the intention of the Chinese government to dominate strategic and pillar sectors discourages 
FDI investment in those sectors. 
 
                                                            
24 .  The negative impact of barriers to FDI in China’s service sectors is typical, with empirical work across 
developed and developing countries finding a strong negative correlation between indicators of policy 
barriers to FDI and FDI inflows (Golub, 2009). 
25  .  In an important reform to separate government ownership and policy functions, China Post Group 
Corporation was formally established in January 2007. 
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In some service sectors, restrictions on FDI have been relaxed somewhat as part of China’s WTO 
commitments. In particular, foreign banks and non-life insurance companies now enjoy close to national 
treatment, although ceilings on foreign investment in domestic banks and insurers remain in place.
26 
However, further liberalisation of access for foreign investors and business would bring substantial 
benefits. As in manufacturing, countries benefit from FDI in services through employment creation, capital 
accumulation, foreign technology transfer, improved service and increased competition. These 
improvements can have important spill-over effects and contribute to productivity gains in manufacturing 
by improving the quality and availability of intermediate inputs. Moreover, in the case of China, increased 
FDI in service sectors would also help reduce the dominance of the SOEs. The Government’s plans to 
open the services sector further to private and foreign participation need to be actively pursued. 
Other barriers also limit the benefits of trade and foreign investment 
China has made significant efforts to reduce discriminatory procedures and other regulatory barriers 
to foreign firms. To enhance transparency, all laws, regulations and other measures concerning trade are 
published in the Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation Gazette. There is also an enquiry point 
through which foreign firms can ask for clarification of laws and regulations affecting trade. The provision 
of draft legislation with adequate time for meaningful consultations with all relevant stakeholders has also 
been improved with the passing of the Legislation Law (2000). Foreign businesses have had the 
opportunity to comment on the draft Labour Contract Law, the Anti-Monopoly Law as well as many 
industry-specific regulations. Efforts have also been made by China to move its standards regime towards 
international practice and efforts by Chinese regulators to reduce unnecessary trade restrictiveness in 
domestic regulation have been advancing. 
 
26 .  Foreign securities companies and mutual fund companies are still prohibited from establishing wholly-
owned subsidiaries and their maximum stake in a joint-venture or domestic company is subject to ceilings 
(OECD, 2010). 
   ECO/WKP(2010)79 
Tariffs on manufactured goods are fairly low in China compared to some other large emerging 
economies. Moreover, the degree of discretion available for raising tariffs is limited, as the average actual 
rate is close to the bound rate, in contrast to other major emerging economies. In addition, the dispersion of 
tariff rates over all products is much lower than in nearly all other emerging markets, indicating that the 
tariff structure is relatively neutral and the degree to which tariffs are used to protect particular industries is 
relatively low. Even so, compared to the United States the average level of tariffs is still high (Table 10). 
The liberalisation of China’s export regime has not proceeded at the same pace as its import regime. 
There are a significant number of differentiated value-added tax rebates on exports of different products. 
Notably, rebates are lower on products that are particularly resource or energy intensive. The scale of the 
reduction in rebates and the sectors to which they are applied change frequently. In addition, China 
maintains export quotas or taxes on a growing number of products (World Trade Organisation, 2010). 
These products are generally raw materials and serve to depress domestic prices for the products below 
world prices. In this way exports of finished products that use these products are effectively subsidised. 
The quota on rare earth exports is of particular note (see above). Chinese state-owned companies have also, 
in the past, attempted to purchase the main advanced economy producers of rare earths, but faced refusals 
from the United States and Australian government (Hurst, 2010). 
With WTO accession, China has effectively locked in many of its trade liberalisation commitments. 
Important areas for future reforms include improving the transparency of regulations for foreign firms 
wishing to do business in China. Procedures for appealing against regulatory changes also need to be 
opened to foreign parties and specific provisions requiring that regulatory administrative procedures avoid 
unnecessary trade restrictiveness need to be introduced. Improvements could also be made in government 
procurement and China’s accession to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement is a high priority. 
Finally, although clear efforts have been made to move China’s standards regime towards international 
practice, foreign enterprises continue to experience difficulties becoming members of private 
standards-setting bodies. Renewed effort to engage all stakeholders is needed to improve transparency in 




Table 10. Tariff rates in China and selected other countries 
2009 
   China  India   Indonesia 
South 
Africa   Brazil  Russia 
United 
States 
Food & live animals                      
  Simple average          
    Actual  13.4  34.6 4.3  7.8  10.1  8.1  2.2 
    Bound  15.6  108.1  45.9 40.3 36.2 n.a. 4.1 
    Most favoured nation  15.6 32.4  5.2  9.2 11.0  9.4  4.1 
  Weighted average          
     Actual  9.7  33.9 4.0  5.4  3.3  5.9  1.3 
     Bound  13.1  96.2  63.0 47.0 40.0 n.a. 4.0 
     Most favoured nation  12.7 39.2  5.2  6.6 10.4  8.1  4.0 
  Standard deviation of rates          
     Actual  10.6  37.3 23.4  10.4  7.4  5.6  7.3 
     Bound  10.4  38.1  20.0 39.4 10.2 n.a. 9.7 
     Most favoured nation  11.1 23.5  11.2  12.2 5.3  4.3  9.8 
           
Manufactured goods          
  Simple average          
     Actual  8.1  8.8 5.7  7.9  14.5  10.5  3.2 
     Bound  9.0  35.1  34.2 17.2 33.7 n.a. 4.2 
     Most favoured nation  8.8 8.9  7.7  9.9  16.1  10.8 4.2 
  Weighted average          
     Actual  4.5  8.8 4.1  5.3  11.1  7.9  1.6 
     Bound  5.7  39.0  35.9 14.5 31.7 n.a. 2.3 
     Most favoured nation  5.1 8.9  7.6  6.8  12.9 9.8 2.3 
  Standard deviation of rates          
     Actual  4.8  2.4  5.0  8.7  8.0  6.2  4.7 
     Bound  4.5  7.6  7.3 8.1 5.4  n.a.  4.7 
     Most favoured nation  4.6 2.2  4.6  9.6 7.8 5.6 5.0 
           
Total trade          
  Simple average          
     Actual  8.2  10.2 5.2  7.6  13.4  8.1  2.9 
     Bound  10.0  50.2  37.5 19.4 31.4 n.a. 3.7 
     Most favoured nation  9.7 12.4  6.8  7.8 13.7  8.7  3.8 
  Weighted average          
     Actual  4.2  7.9  3.1  3.9  7.6  5.9  1.8 
     Bound  5.2  33.1  36.9 19.7 30.5 n.a. 2.8 
     Most favoured nation  4.6 8.1  5.3  4.9  10.1 6.7 3.0 
  Standard deviation of rates          
     Actual  6.5  14.8 11.8  10.5  8.2  6.6  10.0 
     Bound  7.1  39.2  12.3 25.4  8.4 n.a.  11.5 
     Most favoured nation  7.4 15.9  12.7  11.0 8.4  6.1  11.6 
N.A. Not applicable as the Russian Federation is not a member of the World Trade Organisation 
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TECHNICAL ANNEX A1 
To assess differences in TFP across firm ownership classes (Section 4.1 above), a production function 
that accounts for capital intensity, firm size, location and industry is estimated at the micro level. This 
estimation updates the work of Dougherty et al. (2007) and is discussed in detail in that paper. Specifically, 
the following equation is estimated:  
ln(VA) = a + α1ln(L) + α2ln(K) + βln(W) + D.γ1 + O.γ2 + ε   (1) 
where VA is value added (pre-tax, deflated using the implicit gross output deflator), L labour input (in 
full time equivalents), K the capital stock (based on the book value of net fixed assets), W is the relative 
wage (mean-differenced), and the matrix D  is a set of control dummies for scale, time, region, and 
industry; ε is the error term.  
The matrix O of dummy variables represents the various forms of ownership. No dummy has been 
introduced for the group of enterprises directly controlled by the state. Accordingly, the exponential of the 
coefficients on O can be directly interpreted as per cent differences in the constant term, total factor 
productivity. Thus, differences in productivity levels between directly state controlled companies and 
various forms of non-state control are simply the exponential of the estimated coefficients. This equation is 
estimated at the firm level using the industrial firm database of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) (see Dougherty et al. (2007) for a full description of this database). To give insight into changes in 
relative productivity levels across ownership classes, the equation is estimated over two sub-sample 
periods: 1997-2002 and 2003-07. 
The estimation results are given in Table  A1. As was the case in Dougherty  et al. (2007), the 
estimated equation appears to be quite robust across both sample periods, with an adjusted R-squared of 
57% and 58% respectively and highly significant coefficients on all terms, including capital. As discussed 
in detail in the main text, these results confirm that overall productivity is markedly higher in private sector 




Table A1. Firm-based value added production function regression estimates 
1997-2002 2003-2007
Coeff. Coeff.
Regression of log (real value added) on:
log (net fixed assets) 0.223*** 0.247***
log (employees) 0.645*** 0.588***
log (average wage rel. to mean) 0.462*** 0.548***
Type of controlling shareholder - relative to direct state control (state>50%) 
Indirect state, LP>50% 0.295*** 0.307***
Indirect state, other 0.463*** 0.400***
Collective, collective>50% 0.686*** 0.506***
Private, LP>50%  0.703*** 0.537***
Private, individual>50% 0.651*** 0.493***
Private, non-mainland>50% 0.594*** 0.413***
Private, other  0.608*** 0.486***
Scale - relative to under 51 employees
51-100 employees  -0.158*** -0.149***
101-500 employees -0.219*** -0.133***
0.0247***  501-1000 employees -0.131***
over 1000 employees  0.128*** 0.258***
Year dummies  significant significant
Dummies for provincial regions significant significant
Dummies for 2-digit industries  significant significant
Dummies for age of firm insignificant significant
Constant term significant significant
Number of observations (pooled) 877654 1267189
Adjusted R-squared 0.571 0.579 
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